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Abstract In Network cooperative games, due to computational complexity
issues, agents are not able to base their behavior on the ”whole network
status” but have to follow certain ”beliefs” as to how it is in their strategic
interest to act. This behavior constitutes the main interest of this paper.
To this end, we quantify and characterize the set of beliefs that support
cooperation of such agents. Assuming that they are engaged in a differenti-
ated Cournot competition and that they equally split the worth produced,
we characterize the set of coalitional beliefs that support core non-emptiness
and thus guarantee stability of the Network.
Keywords Cooperative game, Cournot competition, Core, Network stability
1 Introduction
Game Theory has nowadays become a frequent research tool to approach
Network Science. Ideas like Nash equilibrium, price of anarchy and stability,
cost allocation, transferable utilities, coalition formation, core, mechanism
design, to name a few, are commonly used not only to understand the be-
havior of complex network phenomena but also to control and efficiently
design such networks. See, for example, Chapter 10 in [1] for a recent sur-
vey. Under the above setting, usually there exists an underlying network
in which some agents (or otherwise stated, players, nodes, firms, etc.) are
linked according to certain relationships and compete following specific rules
in order to optimize a self-interested utility (price, bandwidth, network flow,
etc.). However, as many of the real life problems map to large and complex
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networks [2], our bounded computational ability and known intractability
results [3, 4] restrict our potential to fully unfold and understand coalition
formation in networks.
Due to this complex environment network agents are not able to base
their behavior on the ”whole network status” but have to follow certain be-
liefs as to how it is in their strategic interest to act. This behavior has gained
a lot of attention and such agents are extensively used in Network science
[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. These agents constitute the main interest of this paper.
To this end, we quantify and characterize the set of beliefs that support co-
operation of such agents in a network. In order to illustrate our ideas, we
force the agents to compete under a Cournot competition. We also agree
that in order to conceive of a group of fully cooperating agents we will use a
complete graph (clique). We suppose that at the begining of the competition
all the agents, say N , are fully cooperating and form a large clique or in game
theoretic terms, the grand coalition. We then try to answer the following
Basic Question: Which are the coalitional beliefs of the agents that support
network stability?
By network stability we mean the situation in which every agent cooper-
ates with every other agent and no relationship between any two is broken
(thus no edge is missing from the graph - network).
In the rest of the paper we proceed as follows: In section 2 we present our
model, in sections 3, 4 we present our results and in section 5 we conclude.
2 The model
Consider a set of agents N = {1, 2, · · · , n} which are the nodes of a graph G.
Suppose that these agents are engaged in a cooperative game which we will
soon define. Whenever two agents l, m, 1 ≤ l, m ≤ n, cooperate, we draw
an edge between the corresponding nodes in G. The graph describing all the
cooperations between all the agents in N forms the network. It is clear that
when every agent cooperates with every other, then the network is modeled
by the complete graph (clique) of n nodes. In this case we say that the
agents form the grand coalition. It is also clear that, unless otherwise stated,
every non empty subset of agents S ⊂ N that fully cooperates also forms a
complete subgraph, of G, with s = |S| nodes. Let Pj denote a partition of the
outsiders, N \ S, such that j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n − s} and Pj = {S1, S2, · · · , Sj},
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where
⋃
1≤i≤j
Si = Pj and Sl ∩ Sm = ∅, ∀ l 6= m, 1 ≤ l, m ≤ j. We call Pj ,
a coalition structure with j coalitions. Let sr = |Sr|, r = 1, 2, · · · , j, denote
the number of agents in Sr.
The N agents are put together in order to cooperate under a Cournot
competition, in which everyone must decide how much ”product” to produce,
all decisions have to be made at the same time, and each one must take its
competitors into account. Each agent i ∈ N , produces with the cost function
C(qi) = c · qi and with price function Pi = a− qi− γ
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
qj , where qi is the
quantity produced. The form of Pi implies that we use product differentiation
in the Cournot competition where a > 0 is a constant, c, 0 < c < a, the per
unit cost and γ ∈ (−1, 1] a non zero constant. Let vPjj (S) denote the total
worth (or value or profit or payoff) of coalition S when S faces coalition
structure Pj . Finally, in order to simplify the exposition assume, without
loss of generality, that S = {1, 2, · · · , s}, S1 = {s+ 1, s+ 2, · · · , s+ s1}, · · ·
, Sj = {s+
j−1∑
w=1
sw + 1, · · · , n}.
Consider now the following scenario: a non empty set S ⊂ N of agents
considers not cooperating with the rest and wishes to deviate or in other
words disconnect from the initial network (grand coalition). This would
result in a split of the network into (at least) two disconnected components,
the complete subgraph induced by S = {1, 2, · · · , s} and the rest of the
network denoted by N \ S (the outsiders). Since the consideration of S not
to cooperate constitutes a threat for network stability (the grand coalition
will break if S manages to deviate), decisions have to be made as to whether
specific actions should take place. What would S finally do? The reasonable
thing to do is for the agents of S to calculate their worth, a task not trivial
at all. This is because their worth depends on how the rest of the network
would act. Namely, it depends on the coalition structure that the outsiders
N \ S will form.
3 The worth function
As stated above, we now consider the scenario where a coalition S contem-
plates breaking off from the grand coalition. What are the coalitional beliefs
of the agents in S? In order to answer this we have to reason on what the
outsiders, n− s = |N \S|, will do. Assume that agents in S believe that the
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rest will form j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n−s} coalitions. Since agents compete with each
other, everyone faces an optimization problem, the solution to which gives
the Nash equilibria describing the worth of each agent in the network when
the grand coalition forms. Every agent needs to maximize his worth which is
given by the formula: worth=(price-cost)×quantity produced. Since agents
in every coalition are symmetric, in order to select how much quantity they
should produce, they face respectively the following optimization problems:
agents in S︷ ︸︸ ︷
max
(qi)i∈S
∑
i∈S
(a− qi − γ
∑
l∈N,l 6=i
ql − c)qi
and
outsiders in Sk, k = 1, 2, · · · , j︷ ︸︸ ︷
max
(qh)h∈Sk
∑
h∈Sk
(a− qh − γ
∑
l∈N,l 6=h
ql − c)qh
One of the ideas that underlies the above problems is that due to sym-
metry we do not have to solve the same problem for every agent in the same
coalition. Instead we can treat every different coalition as a ”super agent”
and solve the problem concerning him. This approach is common in such
problems (see for example [10]). We have the following
Theorem 1 If coalition S faces structure Pj and γ > −1n−1 , then there exist
real numbers λ0, · · · , λj such that the worth of S is
v
Pj
j (S) = s(1 + γs− γ)
(
a− c
C0
)2
(1)
where C0 = 2[1 + γ(s− 1)] + γ
j∑
k=1
sk
λk
λ0.
Proof: For the proof we will need the condition K : γ > −1
n−1
which guaran-
tees the existence of Cournot equilibrium when γ ∈ (−1, 0). The first-order
conditions for the optimal quantities of the members of S read
2qi = a− c− 2γ
∑
l∈S,l 6=i
ql − γ
n∑
k=s+1
qk, i ∈ S
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and for each Sk, k = 1, 2, ..., j,
2qh = a− c− 2γ
∑
t∈Sk ,t6=h
qt − γ
∑
r /∈Sk
qr, h ∈ Sk
Notice that due to (intra-coalitional) symmetry, the following must hold

q1 = q2 = · · · = qs ≡ y0
qs+1 = qs+2 = · · · = qs+s1 ≡ y1
...
qi∗+1 = · · · = qn ≡ yj

 (2)
where i∗ = s+
j−1∑
w=1
sw. Letting
1 s = s0, the system to solve for is


2y0 = a− c− 2γ(s0 − 1)y0 − γ(s1y1 + s2y2 + · · ·+ sjyj)
2y1 = a− c− 2γ(s1 − 1)y1 − γ(s0y0 + s2y2 + · · ·+ sjyj)
...
2yj = a− c− 2γ(sj − 1)yj − γ(s0y0 + s1y1 + · · ·+ sj−1yj−1)

 (3)
Considering ith and kth equations of (3) we have
2(yi − yk) = γ(sk − 2)yk − γ(si − 2)yi ⇒ yk = yi(2 + γsi − 2γ)
γsk − 2γ + 2
⇒
j∑
k=0,k 6=i
skyk =
j∑
k=0,k 6=i
skyi(2 + γsi − 2γ)
γsk − 2γ + 2 (4)
Multiplying by γ, using kth equation of (3) and the first equation of (4)
we get,
yi =
a− c
2[1 + γ(si − 1)] + γAi , i = 0, 1, ..., j (5)
where Ai =
j∑
k=0,k 6=i
sk(2+γsi−2γ)
γsk−2γ+2
. Observe that Ai > 0 (due to condition
K).
1From now on we will use both s and s0 to denote the number of agents in S.
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Let us now compute the worth of S. Recall that
v
Pj
j (S) =
∑
i∈S
(a− qi − γ(
∑
l∈S,l 6=i
ql +
n∑
r=s+1
qr)− c)qi
= s0(a− y0 − γ(s0 − 1)y0 − γ
j∑
k=1
skyk − c)y0 (6)
Define λk = γsk−2γ+2, k = 0, 1, ..., j. By using (4) and (5) for i = 0, and
the multiplicities of q’s for each yi in (2) we get the following two equations
j∑
k=1
skyk =
n∑
r=s+1
qr =
j∑
k=1
sk
λk
y0λ0 =
j∑
k=1
sk
λk
a− c
C0
λ0 (7)
∑
l∈S\{0}
y0 =
∑
l∈S\{0}
ql = (s0 − 1)a− c
C0
(8)
where C0 = 2[1 + γ(s0 − 1)] + γ
j∑
k=1
sk
λk
λ0. Using (6,7,8) we get the theo-
rem. 
Using Theorem 1 we have the following
Corollary 1 When the grand coalition forms, the total worth of the network
is
v(N) =
n(a− c)2
4(1 + γ(n− 1)) .
Corollary 1 can be very useful in the following sense. Since, upon cooper-
ation, the agents split the profit equally, when the grand coalition forms each
of them will receive v(N)
n
. This means that no agent would accept deviating
from the grand coalition and join a smaller one if he did not first ensure that
he would receive at least more than v(N)
n
with this move. So a first approach
to the Basic Question is the following
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Answer 1: If no agent assures a profit of at least more than (a−c)
2
4(1+γ(n−1))
, then
no agent likes to deviate and thus the grand coalition forms and the network
does not break.
When the grand coalition forms it is said that the core of the game is
non-empty and since we would like the whole network to be stable and not
to break into disconnected components, we have to characterize the set of
coalitional beliefs that support core non-emptiness. So it is of special interest
to study the core of the above game. This is the subject of the following
section.
4 The core
Before saying anything about the core of the game, let us examine the impact
of the distribution of (s1, · · · , sj) on vPjj (S). This is useful in case agents in
S need to follow a trend in their reasoning. When γ ∈ (0, 1) we have the
following
Proposition 1 For a fixed j, the optima of v
Pj
j (S), w.r.t. (s1, · · · , sj), are
(i) min when si =
n−s
j
, 1 ≤ i ≤ j
(ii) max when si = 1, in all but one value h, and sh = n − s − (j − 1),
h ∈ {1, · · · , j} .
Proof: From (1), v
Pj
j (S) is min when C0 is max which happens when
j∑
k=1
sk
λk
is max which happens when si =
n−s
j
, 1 ≤ i ≤ j, because
j∑
k=1
1
γsk − 2γ + 2 =
j−1∑
k=1
1
γsk − 2γ + 2 +
1
γsj − 2γ + 2
=
j−1∑
k=1
1
γsk − 2γ + 2 +
1
γ(n− s−
j−1∑
k=1
sk)− 2γ + 2
(9)
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Let h(s1, s2, · · · , sj−1) denote the right hand side of (9). To find the vector
of (s1, ..., sj−1) that minimizes (9) we need to solve the system
∂h(s1, s2, ..., sj−1)
∂sk
= 0, k = 1, 2, · · · , j − 1 (10)
Straightforward calculations lead to the solution s1 = · · · = sj−1 = n−sj
(and hence sj =
n−s
j
), so we have (i). In a similar way we can also prove (ii).

Proposition 1 gives the deviating agents a first belief about their potential
worth
Answer 2: If the number of coalitions that outsiders form is fixed, say j,
then the worth of the deviating agents, s, is minimized (hence the network is
less likely to break) when the n−s agents split equally among the j coalitions;
and the worth of s is maximized when j− 1 coalitions have one member and
one coalition has n− s− (j − 1) members.
The above answer gives in a way an incentive to the deviating agents,
meaning that a coalition of agents has a lower incentive to deviate when its
opponents are split equally among j (see Fig. 1).
Another look at how agents in S might reason is given by the following
Proposition 2 When γ = 1, if a coalition S believes that the n−s outsiders
will form more than j∗(n, s) = 2(
√
n
s
− 1) coalitions, then S will not deviate
from the grand coalition.
Proof: Before giving the proof we make the following observation. As said
earlier, since the agents upon cooperation split the profit equally, they know
that when the network does not break they are going to receive v(N)
n
each. On
the other hand, agents belonging to a deviating coalition S, after calculating
their worth, know that upon deviation they are going to receive v(S)
s
each.
So if v(N)
n
≥ v(S)
s
, then no agent in S would like to deviate. Now returning to
the proof, from (5) for γ = 1 we get yi =
a−c
si(2+j)
, 0 ≤ i ≤ j. Hence the value
of S is independent of the size of coalitions of the outsiders but depends only
on their number, i.e. v
Pj
j (S) =
(
a−c
j+2
)2
. The core is then non empty if for
all S, the inequality v(N)
n
≥ v(S)
s
holds, or if 1
4n
≥ 1
s(j+2)2
. The last inequality
holds iff j > j∗(n, s) = 2(
√
n
s
− 1). 
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Proposition 2 implicitly provides agents with another belief in the special
case where γ = 1
Answer 3: In the special case where γ = 1, agents do not have to worry
about what the rest will do, meaning that they do not have to worry about
how the rest are going to split. They only have to worry about how many of
them there are, i.e. their total number.
A more thorough look at how agents in S might think is given by the
following
Theorem 2 Assume γ ∈ (0, 1]. There exists a j∗(n, s, γ), such that the core
is non-empty for all j > j∗(n, s, γ) and all corresponding Pj.
Proof: We seek conditions for the inequality v(N)
n
≥ v
Pj
j (S)
s
to hold:
C0 ≥ 2
√
(1 + γn− γ)(1 + γs− γ)
or 2(1 + γs− γ) + γ
j∑
k=1
sk
λk
λ0 ≥ 2
√
(1 + γn− γ)(1 + γs− γ)
or
j∑
k=1
γsk
γsk + 2(1− γ) ≥ 2
(√
1 + γn− γ
1 + γs− γ − 1
)
/(1 +
1− γ
1 + γs− γ ) ≡ ζ
Since 0 < γ ≤ 1 the sum can not exceed j, so for j∗(n, s, γ) = ζ the core
is non empty for all j > j∗(n, s, γ).
We now have to show that n − s > ζ . But it can be easily proven by
induction on s, 0 < s < n that for fixed n, n > 1 and γ ∈ (0, 1], ζ < n − s.
And since for every s < n, ζ > 0, we have the theorem. 
Theorem 2 gives, in a computational efficient way, a belief as to how
agents in S might think when considering deviation from the Network and
thus constitutes another answer to our Basic Question (see also Fig. 1):
Answer 4: When γ ∈ (0, 1], the network does not break provided that agents
in S believe the outsiders will form a structure with a sufficiently large number
of coalitions (> j∗).
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Using the formula for j∗(n, s, γ) we can prove proposition 2 in a different
way by plugging γ = 1 and get j∗(n, s, 1) = ζ |γ=1 = 2(
√
n
s
− 1) as expected.
Another perspective of the beliefs of agents in S is given by the following
Theorem 3 If γ ∈ (−1, 0) and condition K holds, then the core is non-
empty for all j = 1, 2, · · · , n− s and all Pj.
Proof: The inequality v(N)
n
≥ v
Pj
j (S)
s
holds iff
2 + γ(1 +
1− γ
1 + γs− γ )
j∑
k=1
sk
λk
≥ 2
√
(1 + γn− γ)(1 + γs− γ)
(1 + γs− γ)
or using the definitions σ ≡ 1 + γ(s− 1), ν ≡ 1 + γ(n− 1), it holds iff
2 +
γλ0
σ
j∑
k=1
sk
λk
≥ 2
√
ν
σ
or γ ≥ 2(
√
ν −√σ)√σ
λ0
∑j
k=1
sk
λk
Since γ > −1
n−1
, it suffices to show that
−1
n− 1 >
2(
√
ν −√σ)√σ
λ0
∑j
k=1
sk
λk
or
2(n− 1)(σ −√σν)
λ0
>
j∑
k=1
sk
λk
The maximum value of the term
j∑
k=1
sk
λk
appears at sh = 1 for all but one
h (remember that now γ < 0). It suffices then to show that the left hand
side of the last inequality is greater than the corresponding maximum value
of the sum. So we must show
2(n− 1)(σ −√σν)
λ0
>
j − 1
−γ + 2 +
n− s− (j − 1)
γ(n− s− (j − 1))− 2γ + 2
But λ0 = γs− 2γ + 2 < 2− 2γ so 2(n− 1)(σ −
√
σν)
λ0
>
2(n− 1)(σ −√σν)
2− 2γ
10
or that
2(n− 1)(σ −√σν)
2(1− γ) >
j − 1
2− γ +
n− s− (j − 1)
γ(n− s− (j − 1))− 2γ + 2 (11)
Since j−1
1−γ
> j−1
2−γ
, instead of inequality (11) we can prove that
(n− 1)(σ −√σν)− (j − 1)
1− γ >
n− s− (j − 1)
γ(n− s− (j − 1))− 2γ + 2 (12)
But γ(n− s− (j − 1)) > −1 so n− s− (j − 1)−1− 2γ + 2 >
n− s− (j − 1)
γ(n− s− (j − 1))− 2γ + 2
Instead of (12) we can prove
(n− 1)(σ −√σν)− (j − 1)
1− γ >
n− s− (j − 1)
1− 2γ
or
(n− 1)(σ −√σν)− (j − 1)
1− γ >
n− s− (j − 1)
1− γ
because
n− s− (j − 1)
1− γ >
n− s− (j − 1)
1− 2γ
So must show that σ −√σν > n− s
n− 1 =
n− s+ 1− 1
n− 1 = 1−
s− 1
n− 1
or 1 + γ(s− 1)− γ
√
(
1
γ
+ (s− 1))( 1
γ
+ (n− 1)) > 1− s− 1
n− 1
or γ(s− 1)− γ
√
(
1
γ
+ (s− 1))( 1
γ
+ (n− 1)) > − s− 1
n− 1
Since γ(s− 1) > − s−1
n−1
, it suffices to show that
γ(s− 1)− γ
√
(
1
γ
+ (s− 1))( 1
γ
+ (n− 1)) > γ(s− 1) which holds. 
Theorem 3 gives us another answer to the Basic Question (see also Fig. 2):
Answer 5: The network never breaks when γ ∈ (−1, 0) and γ > −1
n−1
, so no
group of agents will consider deviating from the grand coalition under these
conditions.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we forced a set of n agents to compete under a differentiated
Cournot competition and by imagining their full cooperation as a complete
graph we studied the various beliefs that support core non-emptiness and
thus network stability. Fixing the number of coalitions that outsiders form
to say j coalitions, we proved that the worth of the deviating agents, s, is
minimized (hence the network is less likely to break) when the n− s agents
split equally among the j coalitions; and the worth of s is maximized when
j−1 coalitions have one member and one coalition has n−s−(j−1) members.
Given the above, we proved that when γ > 0 the network does not break,
provided the agents of a deviant coalition believe their opponents will form
a sufficiently large number of coalitions. On the other hand, if γ < 0 and
γ > −1
n−1
, the network does not break irrespective of the beliefs of the deviant
coalition, so no agent will consider deviating. Finally, we proved that when
γ = 1, the deviating agents, in order to calculate their worth and thus decide
what to do, must only worry about how many coalitions are going to be
formed by the outsiders.
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Appendix
Figure 1: On the left, when γ ∈ (0, 1) and for a fixed j, the worth of S
is maximized when the outsiders, N \ S, split in all coalitions but one into
singletons. In this figure we have the case where n = 46, s = 4, and j = 6.
Respectively, on the right the worth is minimized when they split equally
among the j = 6 coalitions, having n−s
j
= 7 agents each.
Figure 2: On the left, when γ ∈ (0, 1] the network does not break provided
that agents in S believe the outsiders will form a large > j∗ number of
coalitions. In this figure we illustrate the case where n = 46, s = 4, and
γ = 0.9, for which j∗(46, 4, 0.9) ≈ 4.57. So when the outsiders split into 5
coalitions the network does not break. On the right, when γ ∈ (−1, 0), the
network does not break irrespective of what S might think.
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